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Abstract
Radio frequency Identification(RFID) system is latest a technology. It has been used
in various application in the world. Radio frequency identification(RFID) can be used
in supply chain management, automated payment systems and other daily application as
essential technology to enhance lives of human beings. RFID systems are vulnerable
for many malicious attacks against privacy and security. To solve these problems, many
authentication protocols based on cryptography scheme have been developed in order to
ensure preservation of privacy. However, many of the these approaches cannot fully pro-
tect privacy in the presence of malicious readers or insider attacks. Our research work
in thesis mainly focuses on designing secure RFID authentication schemes with untrace-
ability. We observe a number of recent proposed RFID authentication scheme as well
as related. Cryptography techniques, and then define the security and privacy require-
ment for our RFID systems. Our main contribution in this thesis consist proposed RFID
authentication.
Generally, the weakness of RFID technology is authentication systems between a
reader and a tag become weak. In this thesis, we introduced RFID tag - reader authentica-
tion scheme for use under the electronic product code global frame work . Which is more
efficient for possible privacy and security threats in RFID system. This scheme is based
on 16-bit random number. Random number is generated by 16-bit linear feedback shift
register(LFSR). 16-bit Linear feedback shift register(LFSR) is based on polynomial feed-
back X16+X14+X13+X11+1. We further analysed the RFID system’s security strength
against various attacking scenarios, such that man in middle attack, eavesdropping, replay
attack and mutual authentication.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In This chapter describes the overview of the thesis. Part 1.1 describes the background
of RFID technology and part 1.2 describes the application of RFID technology. Part 1.3
explains the research issues in RFID sysetms and describes the motivation of my research
in part 1.4. The contribution of this thesis gives in part 1.5, and describes the organisation
of the thesis in part 1.6.
1.1 RFID Technology
RFID systems is new technology. It is used in identify and track objects automatically
through radio waves. It has been considered as a replacement of barcode and given some
attractive features (12) (13). RFID systems have three main parts : reader, tags and back-
end server. It is called as transponders. Transmitter or receiver is part of a transponder.
That is contemplated to gets a needed radio signal and automatically send a response. In
its easier implementing, the transponder listens via a radio beacon, and transmits a beacon
of its itself as a response. As active tags do not hold to respond on being powered through
the reader, active tag are not limited to operating inside the near field. Active tag can be
interrogated and reply at forward distances away by the reader, its means that active tags
(at a minimum) are able to sending and taking over larger distances Semi-passive tags hold
a battery to power the memory circuitry, but depend on the near Field for power the radio
circuits during the getting and transmitting of data. As active tags do not hold to respond
on being powered through the reader, active tag are not limited to operating inside the near
field. Passive tag is called as dead tag. Because passive tag do not have battery. Passive
tag have only EPC, 32-bit password and common random number procedure. Battery or
other power sources does not in RFID passive tags. In order to passive tags for work, the
2
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antenna and the tag must be near impendency for the reader, as the tags keep an interior
power source, and derive itself power to send by coupling for the near field of the antenna.
So, passive tags must waiting to a signal by a reader. Getting power by the reader device
is completed by an electromagnetic properties . Passive Tag do not keep internal power
source, such as batteries. So, they are cheap and small. The microchip inside the tag is
able to get power from the reader’s interrogation radio signals. All are shown in figure
1.1 (20).
Figure 1.1: RFID Systems Components
1.1.1 RFID Tags
Class of radio devices have units of RFID. It is called as transponders. Transmitter or
receiver is part of a transponder. That is contemplated to gets a needed radio signal and
automatically send a response. In its easier implementing, the transponder listens via
a radio beacon, and transmits a beacon of its itself as a response. The transponder listen
signal by beacon and after send by beacon of its self. Very difficult process may send a one
alphabets or numbers back through the sources, or transmit many characters of numbers
and letters. Lastly, blooming process can do a compute or checking system and combined
encrypted radio broadcasting to finished eavesdroppers via finding the information being
sending class of radio devices have units of RFID. It is called as transponders. Transmitter
or receiver is part of a transponder. That is contemplated to gets a needed radio signal and
automatically send a response. In its easier implementing, the transponder listens via a
radio beacon, and transmits a beacon of its itself as a response. As active tags do not hold
to respond on being powered through the reader, active tag are not limited to operating
inside the near field. Active tag can be interrogated and reply at forward distances away
3
1.1. RFID TECHNOLOGY CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
by the reader, its means that active tags (at a minimum) are able to sending and taking
over larger distances Semi-passive tags hold a battery to power the memory circuitry, but
depend on the near field for power the radio circuits during the getting and transmitting of
data. As active tags do not hold to respond on being powered through the reader, active tag
are not limited to operating inside the near field.Passive tag is called as dead tag. Because
passive tag do not have battery. Passive tag have only EPC, 32-bit password and common
random number procedure. Battery or other power sources does not in RFID passive tags.
In order to passive tags for work, the antenna and the tag must be near independency for
the reader, as the tags keep an interior power source, and derive itself power to send by
coupling for the near field of the antenna. So, passive tags must waiting to a signal by a
reader. Getting power by the reader device is completed by an electromagnetic properties.
Passive tag do not keep internal power source, such as batteries. So, they are cheap and
small.The microchip inside the tag is able to get power from the reader’s interrogation
radio signals. A communication session can only be initiated by a reader range between
a passive tag and a reader is limited. It called as the near field. While the name implies,
the device must be comparatively near the reader in order for work. The near field in brief
supplies sufficient power to the tag because it can transmits a reply(15) (17).
•Firstoneisencoding/decodingcircuitry
•Secondoneismemory
•T hirdoneisantenna
•Lastispowersupplycommunicationsprocess
Passive Tag
Passive tag is called as dead tag. Because passive tag do not have battery. Passive tag
have only EPC, 32-bit password and common random number procedure. Battery or
other power sources does not in RFID passive tags. In order to passive tags for work,
the antenna and the tag must be near impendency for the reader, as the tags keep an
interior power source, and derive itself power to send by coupling for the near field of the
antenna. So, passive tags must waiting to a signal by a reader. The tag hold a echoic circuit
competent of tempting power via the reader’s antenna. Getting power by the reader device
is completed by an electromagnetic properties . Passive tag do not keep internal power
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source, such as batteries. So, they are cheap and small. The microchip inside the tag is
able to get power from the reader’s interrogation radio signals. A communication session
can only be initiated by a reader range between a passive tag and a reader is limited. It
called as the near field. While the name implies, the device must be comparatively near
the reader in order for work. The near field in brief supplies sufficient power to the tag
because it can transmits a reply (6) (16).
In order to passive tags for work, the antenna and the tag must be near impendency for
the reader, as the tags keep an interior power source, and derive itself power to send by
coupling for the near field of the antenna. The near field gets benefits of electromagnetic
cretic and generates a small, less-lived electrical pulse with the passive tag that can power
a tag large enough for it to reply.
passive tag do not keep internal power source, such as batteries. So, they are cheap and
small. The microchip inside the tag is able to get power from the reader’s interrogation
radio signals. A communication session can only be initiated by a reader range between
a passive tag and a reader is limited (19) (20).
Semi-passive tag and Active Tag
The successively for a passive tag is an active tag. Active tags keep their itself power
source, commonly an interior battery. So, active tag hold a battery for power the radio
circuitry, active tag can actively send and gets on their itself, without hold to be powered
through the near field of the reader’s antenna . As active tags do not hold to respond on
being powered through the reader, active tag are not limited to operating inside the near
field. Active tag can be interrogated and reply at forward distances away by the reader, its
means that active tags (at a minimum) are able to sending and taking over larger distances
Semi-passive tags hold a battery to power the memory circuitry, but depend on the near
field for power the radio circuits during the getting and transmitting of data. As active tags
do not hold to respond on being powered through the reader, active tag are not limited to
operating inside the near field. Passive tag is called as dead tag. Because passive tag
do not have battery. Passive tag have only EPC, 32-bit password and common random
number procedure. Battery or other power sources does not in RFID passive tags. In order
to passive tags for work, the antenna and the tag must be near impendency for the reader,
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as the tags keep an interior power source, and derive itself power to send by coupling for
the near field of the antenna. So, passive tags must waiting to a signal by a reader. Getting
power by the reader device is completed by an electromagnetic properties . Passive tag
do not keep internal power source, such as batteries. So, they are cheap and small. The
microchip inside the tag is able to get power from the reader’s interrogation radio signals.
A communication session can only be initiated by a reader range between a passive tag
and a reader is limited. It called as the near field. While the name implies, the device
must be comparatively near the reader in order for work. The near field in brief supplies
sufficient power to the tag because it can transmits a reply(1) (14).
Figure 1.2: RFID Passive and Active Tag Process
1.1.2 RFID Readers
The second component of RFID system is reader. Reader is read the information from
the tags and then store in server or database. Reader is depends on distance because when
distance is large then we are used high frequency reader and while distance is sort then we
are used low frequency reader. As active tags do not hold to respond on being powered
through the reader, active tag are not limited to operating inside the near field. Active
tag can be interrogated and reply at forward distances away by the reader, its means that
active tags (at a minimum) are able to sending and taking over larger distances Semi-
passive tags hold a battery to power the memory circuitry, but depend on the near field
6
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for power the radio circuits during the getting and transmitting of data. As active tags
do not hold to respond on being powered through the reader, active tag are not limited
to operating inside the near field. Passive tag is called as dead tag. Because passive tag
do not have battery. Passive tag have only EPC, 32-bit password and common random
number procedure. Battery or other power sources does not in RFID passive tags. In
order to passive tags for work, the antenna and the tag must be near impendency for
the reader, as the tags keep an interior power source, and derive itself power to send by
coupling for the Near Field of the antenna. So, Passive tags must waiting to a signal by a
reader. Getting power by the reader device is completed by an electromagnetic properties
. Passive tag do not keep internal power source, such as batteries. So they are cheap and
small. The microchip inside the tag is able to get power from the reader’s interrogation
radio signals. A communication session can only be initiated by a reader range between
a passive tag and a reader is limited. It called as the Near Field. While the name implies,
the device must be comparatively near the reader in order for work. The near field in brief
supplies sufficient power to the tag because it can transmits a reply.
1.2 RFID Applications
Beginning from the 90s, RFID technology has launched in a variety of commercial prod-
ucts. For example, Wal-Mart has started to require their suppliers to adopt RFID technol-
ogy in their own smart cards after year 2000. This initiative has been the biggest push
for commercial usage of this technology in the recent years. Beside, the massive com-
mercial adoption in the marketplace, such technology has also been applied in military in
the United States. In the following section, we presented some common applications for
RFID tags and highlighting their security concerns. RFID tags can also store personal in-
formation for security check-ins. Another common RFID application is the RFID-enabled
vehicle immobilizer in the auto- motive industry. There is an embedded chip in each key
that sends out out an 32-bit encrypted radio-frequency signal forming a particular code.
With this code, the driver is able to start the car and activate the fuel pump with ease. As a
result, this technology has increased anti-theft capability in the automotive industry. For
example, an employee carries an ID card, embedded with a RFID chip, could authenticate
7
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his or her identity at the security entry in a facility within a very short period of time. The
embedded chips in the new passports store the same personal information as those in the
old printed document, including names, nationalities, sex, dates of birth, places of birth,
ngerprints, and photos of the passport holders.
1. For instance, pharmaceutical industries in the United States, capturing ten percent
of the global market, makes 32 billion dollars. The recent increase of counterfeit or
diluted drugs has caught the attention of Food and Drug Administration (FDA). FDA
considered this as a threat to public health. Implementation of the RFID technology
could immediately improve pharmaceutical supply chain safety through real-time, oine,
and item-level authentication, from the initial point of manufacturing to the nal stage of
dispensing drugs to consumers in the pharmacies.This touch-free payment system speeds
up transactions, when customers only need to place their credit cards in close proximity
to an RFID reader. (7).
2. Many RFID-based payment systems are widely used in our daily life, including
RFID- capable credit cards from major credit card association and companies and pay-
ment cards in mass transit systems. This touch-free payment system speeds up transac-
tions, when customers only need to place their credit cards in close proximity to an RFID
reader. RFID tags can also store personal information for security check-ins. For exam-
ple, an employee carries an ID card, embedded with a RFID chip, could authenticate his
or her identity at the security entry in a facility within a very short period of time. The
embedded chips in the new passports store the same personal information as those in the
old printed document, including names, nationalities, sex, dates of birth, places of birth,
ngerprints, and photos of the passport holders.
3. Another common RFID application is the RFID-enabled vehicle immobilizer in the
auto- motive industry. There is an embedded chip in each key that sends out out an 32-bit
encrypted radio-frequency signal forming a particular code. With this code, the driver is
able to start the car and activate the fuel pump with ease. As a result, this technology has
increased anti-theft capability in the automotive industry.
4. RFID tags can also store personal information for security check-ins. For example,
an employee carries an ID card, embedded with a RFID chip, could authenticate his or her
8
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identity at the security entry in a facility within a very short period of time. The embedded
chips in the new passports store the same personal information as those in the old printed
document, including names, nationalities, sex, dates of birth, places of birth, ngerprints,
and photos of the passport holders (4) (6) (8).
1.3 Motivation
To address all these objective mentioned below,The research should concern many prop-
erties about RFID security and privacy.
Tag authentication is called a tag prove its validity for a reader, while reader authen-
tication is in the opposite way. Mutual authentication is used for tag and reader authenti-
cation. In especially, tag authentication is more important because tags are very easier to
counterfeit than readers. Authentication is an more effective approach to prevent attacks.
Untraceability means that a tag is both anonymous and indistinguishable to an adver-
sary. Although an RFID tag is vulnerable to compromise, an malicious reader should
not identify the communication records of this tag in the past or future session. Thus,a
protocol should not leak the identity or internal secret of RFID tags in communication
processes.
Performance requirements should be satisfied. Considering the limited storage and
computational ability of low-cost tags, cryptographic techniques used in the schemes
should be basic and restricted. Besides, a back-end server may deal with a plenty of
tags in one RFID system in real world scenarios. Thus,an RFID scheme should also be
scalable and especially easy for a server to search the information of a tag in the database
for these issues, the thesis focuses on designing secure and untraceable authentication
schemes for RFID systems.
1.4 Objectives of Research
The weakness of RFID systems technology, it is high cost. Mutual authentication between
a tag and a reader is less.
• To provide more security between reader and tag.
• To prevention Man-in-the-middle attack.
9
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• To prevention Mutual Authentication.
1.5 Organisation of Thesis
The rest of Thesis is organized as follow:
Chapter 2: In this chapter A survey of Tag-reader authentication for RFID systems
as reported in the literature is mentioned.
Chapter 3:In this chapter we have shown Proposed authentication scheme and Exist-
ing Authentication scheme.
Chapter 4:In this chapter we have shown simulation result and implementation.
Chapter 5:In this chapter we have shown about conclusion and future work.
10
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Chapter 2
Literature Survey
Konidala et at. (1) proposed a scheme which is taken large time to mutual authenti-
cation.Which is more secure than other scheme.It is not implemented in hardware.It is
process completely depend kill passwords and access password.
However, due to the wireless nature of communication in RFID, identity theft can be
achieve more easily without proper security measurement. Personal information is ex-
posed for hackers, who would break into the devices, snap personal information, and then
walk away with it. Unauthorized duplication of passports not only jeopardizes millions
of Americans privacy, it also threatens national security (13).
Peris-Lopez et al. (2) required a Mix Bits function,which need more iterations to
complete. This scheme is take more time for authentication between tag’s and reader.
In addition, many public transportation systems are also RFID-ready in major cities
around the world, such as Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority system in Boston,
the Easy Card for Taipei Metro system, and Octopus Card in Hong Kong. The adoption
of the RFID technology in these markets has made the mass transit systems transforming
from a slow cash collection process to a speedy fare scan-and-go process. Vending ma-
chines or many marketplaces in the cities can dispense the transit cards providing riders
convenient sale methods and locations.
Li et al. (10) proposed a EX-OR approach for an fast implementation of protocol.
It is take less time in computation to EX-OR operation. And this scheme is completely
depend on EX-OR and random number.
Schulte et al. (14) This scheme is completely based on truncated multipliers. Trun-
cated multiplier is take less time for authentication between tags and reader.
Huang et al. (12) changes the Pad gen function given by Konidala et al. It is more
12
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secure than konidala approach because some modification in the previous approach.
Ko and and Hsiao. (13) proposed an efficient array based truncated multiplier. This
scheme is implemented in hardware. This is take less time other approach.
Active tags and passive tags hold batteries. The difference both of them is that. Active
tags are able to power their memory circuitry and radio circuits. Semi passive tags still
need the reader’s radio-frequency signals to power their radio circuits. So, Both contain
their itself power source. Both of them can communicate with reader in a larger distance
compared to passive tags.
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Chapter 3
Authentication Scheme
3.1 EPC class-1 generation-2 standard
32-bit secure password is kept in the tag’s reserved memory if this password is true,
then data transmit will be build between tag and reader. Firstly reader send a requests
to tag. Tag is created a random number after transmit for reader.The reader computes
encrypted password using performing a bit wise exclusive-or between actual password
and random number. The encrypted password is send for the tag. The tag calculates
encrypted password using performing a bit wise exclusive-or between actual password
and random number. The encrypted password using performing a bit wise EX-OR of
the gets encrypted password with the original as shown in Fig.3.1 and Fig.3.2. In this
approach , both random number transmit in unencrypted form. Man in middle attack is
possible to happen by takes exclusive-or operation between the encrypted passwords and
random number, that gives actual password and their via unauthorized reader get the tags
data. 32-bit secure password is kept in the tag’s reserved memory if this password is true,
then data transmit will be build between tag and reader. Firstly reader send a requests
to tag. Tag is created a random number after transmit for reader.The reader computes
encrypted password using performing a bit wise exclusive-or between actual password
and random number. The encrypted password is send for the tag.(10).
3.2 Authentication using Diffie Hellman Algorithm
Fig.3.3 and Fig.3.4 explain the proposed scheme communication step between a tag and
a reader and the detailed classification of the proposed scheme is as follow.
Step 1: Firstly, reader send a request data for tag.
Step 2: The tag compute the value of R1 by P, Q and PWDL.
15
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Figure 3.1: Authentication Approach Proposed by EPC Global
Figure 3.2: Authentication Approach Proposed by EPC Global
Step 3: The tag responds by generating R1 and EPC.
Step 4: EPC and R1 information is send for the server by the reader.
Step 5: The server compute the value of R2 by P, Q and PWDL.
Step 6: Checking of R1=R2 is completed. Whether it is true the process continues
16
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else communication is finished.
Step 7: The server calculate the value of R3 by P, Q and PWDM.
Step 8: The server responds by R3 and EPC to reader.
Step 9: The reader responds by R3 and EPC to tag.
Step 10: The tag compute the value of R4 by P, Q and PWDM.
Step 11: Checking of R4=R3 is done. If it is true the process continues else commu-
nication is finished.
Figure 3.3: Authentication using Diffie Hellman Algorithm
Figure 3.4: Authentication using Diffie Hellman Algorithm
17
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3.3 Proposed Authentication Scheme
3.3.1 Proposed Scheme
There are three main component of proposed scheme. First is tag and Second is reader and
third one is database or server. In the proposed scheme, each tag have an unique Electronic
Product Code(EPC), Password(PWD) and Linear Feedback Shift Register(LFSR) given
by manufacturer to encrypted Password(PWD). The database hold the information about
Electronic Product Code(EPC) and Password(PWD) for all tags. It also keep a same
protocol architecture. It is given in all tags (5) (12).
Fig.3.5 and Fig.3.6 shown the proposed scheme communication step between a reader
and a tag and the detailed classification of the proposed scheme is as follow.
Step 1: Firstly, Reader transmits a request message for Tag.
Step 2: Tag transmits the response to reader with EPC and Seed value.
Step 3: Reader generate Random Number Reader One(RNR1) using Seed Value(SV).
Step 4: Reader compute Encrypted Password Lower Reader(EPWDLR) using Ran-
dom Number Reader One(RNR1) and Password Lower(PWDL).
Step 5: Reader transmits Encrypted Password Lower Reader(EPWDLR) and Elec-
tronic product Code(EPC) to Tag.
Step 6: Tag generate Random number using Seed value.
Step 7: Tag compute Encrypted Password Lower Tag(EPWDLT) using Random Num-
ber Tag One(RNT1) and Password Lower (PWDL).
Step 8: Checking of Encrypted Password Lower Tag(EPWDLT)=Encrypted Password
Lower Reader(EPWDLR) is completed. Whether it is true the process continues else
communication is finished.
Step 9: Tag generate Random Number Tag Two(RNT2) using Random Number Tag
One(RNT1).
Step 10: Tag compute Encrypted Password Most Tag (EPWDMT) using Random
Number Tag Two(RNT2) and Password Most(PWDM).
Step 11: Tag send Encrypted Password Most Tag(EPWDMT) and Electronic Product
Code(EPC) to Reader.
Step 12: Reader generate Random Number Reader Two(RNR2) using Random Num-
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ber Reader One(RNR1).
Step 13: Reader compute Encrypted Password Most Reader(EPWDMR) using Ran-
dom Number Reader(RNR2) and Password Most(PWDM).
Step 14:Checking of Encrypted Password Most Reader(EPWDMR)=Encrypted Pass-
word Most Tag(EPWDMT )is completed. whether it is true the process continues else
communication is finished.
Figure 3.5: Proposed RFID Authentication Scheme
3.3.2 Reader Operation
Reader is read the information from the tags after store in database. Rearder operation is
shown in Fig. 3.6.
Initialize: RRT[16] , EPWDLR[16] , EPWDLR[16] , EPC , PWDL[16] , PWDM[16]
RNR1[16] , C , RNR2[16] , I;
1. Begin For I = 1 to 16
RRT[ I]=rand()÷2
End For
2. ReaderSendRequest(RRT)
3. TagSendSeedValue(EPC,SV)
Begin For I =1 to 16
19
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Figure 3.6: Proposed RFID Authentication Scheme
C=SV[16] ⊕SV [14]⊕SV [13]⊕SV [11]
Begin For I=1 to 15
SV[I+1]=SV[I]
End For
SV[1]=C
RNR1[I]=SV[16]
End For
Begin For I=1 to 16
EPWDLR[I]=RNR1[I] ⊕PWDL[I]
End For
4. ReaderSendenEncrypted(EPWDLR , EPC)
5. TagSendEncrypted(EPWDMT , EPC)
Begin :For I=1 to 16
C=RNR1[16]⊕RNR1[14]⊕RNR1[13]⊕RNR1[11]
Begin : For I=1 to 15
RNR1[I+1]=RNR1[I]
End For
RNR1[1]=C
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RNR2[I]=RNR1[16]
End For
Begin : For I=1 to 16
EPWDMR[I]=RNR2[I] ⊕PWDM[I]
End For
Begin : For I=1 to 16
Begin :
If (EPWDMR[I] == EPWDMT[I])
Else
Abort
Break
End If
End For
Tag Authentication
Process Continue
Figure 3.7: Reader Operation
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3.3.3 Tag Operation
Tag hold information about that things. That information is store in barcode. Tag hold a
unique Electronic product code. Tag operation is shown in Fig.3.7.
Initialize: EPWDLT[16] , EPWDMT[16] ,SV[16] , RNT1[16] , RNT2[16] , I ,
EPC , C
1. ReaderSendRequest(RRT)
Begin : For I=1 to 16
SV=rand()÷2
End For
2.TagSendSeedValue(EPC , SV )
3. ReaderSendEncrypted(EPWDLR , EPC)
Begin : For I=1 to 16
C=SV[16] ⊕SV [14]⊕SV [13]⊕SV [11]
Begin : For I=1 to 15
SV[I+1]=SV[I]
End For
SV[1]=C
RNT1[I]=SV[16]
End For
Begin : For I=1 to 16
EPWDLT[I]=RNT1[I] ⊕PWDL[I]
End For
Begin :For I=1 to 16
Begin :
If( EPEDLT[I] = = EPWDLR[I])
Else
Process Abort
Break
End If
End For
22
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Reader Authentication
Begin : For I=1 to 16
C=RNT1[16] ⊕RNT 1[14]⊕RNT 1[13]⊕RNT 1[11]
Begin : For I=1 to 15
RNT1[I+1]= RNT1[I]
End For
RNT1[1]=C
RNT2[I]=RNT1[16]
End For
Begin : For I=1 to 16
EPWDMT[I]=RNT2[I] ⊕PWDM[I]
o cm End For
4. TagSendEncrypted(EPWDMT , EPC)
Figure 3.8: Tag Operation
3.3.4 Linear Feedback Shift Register
Linear Feedback Shift Register(LFSR) is a shift register its input bit is a linear function
of its previous state. The most commonly used linear function of single bits is exclusive-
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or. An Linear Feedback Shift Register(LFSR)is most often a shift register its input bit
is driven by the exclusive or (EXOR) of the whole shift register value. The initial value
of the Linear Feedback Shift Register(LFSR) is called Seed Value. So the register has a
definite number of possible states. Though, an Linear Feedback Shift Register(LFSR)with
a select feedback function can be produced a order of bits that appeared random number
(20) (15).
16-bit Linear Feedback Shift Register(LFSR) as maximum length feedback polyno-
mial X16+X14+X13+X11+1 creates 216−1 = 65535 random outputs (11) (13).
The diagram for 16-bit linear feedback shift register(LFSR) with maximum length
polynomial is shown in Fig.3.8.
Figure 3.9: 16-bit Linear Feedback Shift Register with Maximum Length Feedback Poly-
nomial X16+X14+X13+X11+1
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Simulation & Results
This chapter gives overview about simulation and security analysis.Section 4.1 explain
about simulation and implementation. Section 4.2 explain about security analysis.
4.1 Simulation and Implementation
Linear feedback shift register is used to described the proposed RFID authentication
scheme. This approach is simulated in C language.
Fig 4.1 shows simulation output of the propose scheme.
Where SV=001110111100101.
RR=1011011011110111.
PWDL=1001011010110011.
PEDM=1100110011001100.
RNT1=110100111011110.
RNT2=1011110111100101.
RNR1=1101001111011110.
RNR2=1011110111100101.
EPWDLT=0100010101101101.
EPWDLR=0100010101101101.
EPWDMT=0111000100101001.
EPWDMR=0111000100101001.
Whenever the EPWDLR and EPWDMR mathces with the value of EPWDLT and EP-
WDMT respectively mutual authentication becomes high.
R:Generate RR
16 Times RR=rand()%2
26
4.1. SIMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATIONCHAPTER 4. SIMULATION & RESULTS
Figure 4.1: Simulation Results of Proposed Scheme
RR=1011011011110111
R send request to T: RR=101101110111
T:Generate SV
16 Times SV=rand()%2
SV=001110111100101
T send SV and EPC to R: SV=0011110111100101 EPC=ACE14789BD105612
R: Generate RNR1
16 Times C=SV[16] XOR SV[14] XOR SV[13] XOR SV[11]
SV[I+1]=SV[I]
SV[I]=C
RNR1[I]=SV[16]
RNR1=1101001111011110
PWDL=1001011010110011
R : Compute EPWDLR
16 Times EPWDLR[I]=RNR1[I] XOR PWDL[I]
EPWDLR=0100010101101101
Reader send EPC and EPWDLR to Tag: EPC=ACE14789BD105612 EPWDLR=0100010101101101
T : Generate RNT1
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RNR1[I]=SV[16] SV[I+1]=SV[I] SV[I]=C C=SV[16] XOR
SV[14] XOR SV[13]
XOR SV[11]
SV 001111011110010 1
1 0 011110111100101 1 1
2 1 111101111001011 0 0
3 1 111011110010110 0 0
4 1 110111100101100 1 1
5 1 101111001011001 1 1
6 0 011110010110011 0 0
7 1 111100101100110 0 0
8 1 111001011001100 1 1
9 1 110010110011001 1 1
10 1 100101100110011 1 1
11 0 001011001100111 1 1
12 0 010110011001111 0 0
13 1 101100110011110 1 1
14 0 011001100111101 1 1
15 1 110011001111011 0 0
16 1 100110011110110 0 0
Table 4.1: RNR1 generate by Reader
RNR1[I] PWDL[I] EPWDLR[I] = RNR1[I] XOR PWDL[I]
1 0 1 1
2 1 1 0
3 1 0 1
4 1 0 1
5 1 1 0
6 0 1 1
7 1 0 1
8 1 1 0
9 1 0 1
10 1 1 0
11 0 1 1
12 0 0 0
13 1 1 0
14 0 0 0
15 1 0 1
16 1 1 0
Table 4.2: EPWDLR compute by Reader
16 times C=SV[16] XOR SV[14] XOR SV[13] XOR SV[11]
SV [I+1] = SV[I]
SV[I]=C
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RNT1[I]=SV[16]
RNRT1[I]=SV[16] SV[I+1]=SV[I] SV[I]=C C=SV[16] XOR
SV[14] XOR SV[13]
XOR SV[11]
SV 001111011110010 1
1 0 011110111100101 1 1
2 1 111101111001011 0 0
3 1 111011110010110 0 0
4 1 110111100101100 1 1
5 1 101111001011001 1 1
6 0 011110010110011 0 0
7 1 111100101100110 0 0
8 1 111001011001100 1 1
9 1 110010110011001 1 1
10 1 100101100110011 1 1
11 0 001011001100111 1 1
12 0 010110011001111 0 0
13 1 101100110011110 1 1
14 0 011001100111101 1 1
15 1 110011001111011 0 0
16 1 100110011110110 0 0
Table 4.3: RNT1 generate by Tag
RNT1=110100111011110
PWDL=1001011010110011
T : Compute EPWDLT
16 Times EPWDLT[I]=RNT1[I] XOR PWDL[I]
T : Verify EPWDLT , EPWDLR
EPWDLT= 0100010101101101
EPWDLR=0100010101101101
Process If Success, Abort if failure
Reader Authentication
T : Generate RNT2
RNT1=1101001111011110
16 times C=RNT1[16] XOR RNT1[14] XOR RNT1[13] XOR RNT1[11]
RNT1 [I+1] = RNT1[I]
RNT1[I]=C
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RNT1[I] PWDL[I] EPWDLT[I] = RNT1[I] XOR PWDL[I]
1 0 1 1
2 1 1 0
3 1 0 1
4 1 0 1
5 1 1 0
6 0 1 1
7 1 0 1
8 1 1 0
9 1 0 1
10 1 1 0
11 0 1 1
12 0 0 0
13 1 1 0
14 0 0 0
15 1 0 1
16 1 1 0
Table 4.4: EPWDLR compute by Tag
EPWDLT[I] EPWDLR[I] EPWDLT[I] = EPWDLR[I]
1 1 1 T
2 0 0 T
3 1 1 T
4 1 1 T
5 0 0 T
6 1 1 T
7 1 1 T
8 0 0 T
9 1 1 T
10 0 0 T
11 1 1 T
12 0 0 T
13 0 0 T
14 0 0 T
15 1 1 T
16 0 0 T
Table 4.5: Reader Authentication
RNT2[I]=RNT1[16]
RNT2=1011110111100101
PWDM=1100110011001100
T : Compute EPWDMT
16 times EPWDMT[I]=RNT2[I] XOR PWDM[I]
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RNT2[I]=RNT1[16] RNT1[I+1]=RNT1[I] RNT1[I]=C C=RNT1[16] XOR
RNT1[14] XOR
RNT1[13] XOR
RNT1[11]
RNT1 110100111101111 0
1 1 101001111011110 0 0
2 0 010011110111100 1 1
3 1 100111101111001 1 1
4 0 001111011110011 1 1
5 0 011110111100111 1 1
6 1 111101111001111 0 0
7 1 111011110011110 0 0
8 1 110111100111100 1 1
9 1 101111001111001 1 1
10 0 011110011110011 1 0
11 1 111100111100110 1 1
12 1 111001111001101 0 1
13 1 110011110011011 1 0
14 1 100111100110110 1 1
15 0 001111001101101 0 1
16 1 011110011011011 0 0
Table 4.6: RNT2 generate by Tag
RNT2[I] PWDM[I] EPWDMT[I] = RNT2[I] XOR PWDM[I]
1 1 0 1
2 0 0 0
3 1 1 0
4 0 1 1
5 0 0 0
6 1 0 1
7 1 1 0
8 1 1 0
9 1 0 1
10 0 0 0
11 1 1 0
12 1 1 0
13 1 0 1
14 1 0 1
15 0 1 1
16 1 1 1
Table 4.7: EPWDMT compute by Tag
EPWDMT=0111000100101001
Tag send EPWDMT and EPC to Reader: EPWDMT = 0111000100101001. EPC
31
4.1. SIMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATIONCHAPTER 4. SIMULATION & RESULTS
= ACE14789BD105612
R : Generate RNR2
RNR1=1101001111011110
16 times C=RNR1[16] XOR RNR1[14] XOR RNR1[13] XOR RNR1[11]
RNR1 [I+1] = RNR1[I]
RNR1[I]=C
RNR2[I]=RNR1[16]
RNR2[I]=RNR1[16] RNR1[I+1]=RNR1[I] RNR1[I]=C C=RNR1[16] XOR
RNR1[14] XOR
RNR1[13] XOR
RNR1[11]
RNR1 110100111101111 0
1 1 101001111011110 0 0
2 0 010011110111100 1 1
3 1 100111101111001 1 1
4 0 001111011110011 1 1
5 0 011110111100111 1 1
6 1 111101111001111 0 0
7 1 111011110011110 0 0
8 1 110111100111100 1 1
9 1 101111001111001 1 1
10 0 011110011110011 1 0
11 1 111100111100110 1 1
12 1 111001111001101 0 1
13 1 110011110011011 1 0
14 1 100111100110110 1 1
15 0 001111001101101 0 1
16 1 011110011011011 0 0
Table 4.8: RNR2 generate by Reader
R:Compute EPWDMR
RNR2=1011110111100101
PWDM=1100110011001100
16 times EPWDMR[I]=RNR2[I] XOR PWDM[I]
EPWDMR=0111000100101001
R : Verify EPWDMR , EPWDMT
EPWDMR = 0111000100101001
EPWDMT=0111000100101001
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RNR2[I] PWDM[I] EPWDLT[I] = RNR2[I] XOR PWDM[I]
1 1 0 1
2 0 0 0
3 1 1 0
4 0 1 1
5 0 0 0
6 1 0 1
7 1 1 0
8 1 1 0
9 1 0 1
10 0 0 0
11 1 1 0
12 1 1 0
13 1 0 1
14 1 0 1
15 0 1 1
16 1 1 1
Table 4.9: EPWDLR compute by Tag
EPWDMT[I] EPWDMR[I] EPWDMT[I] = EPWDMR[I]
1 1 1 T
2 0 0 T
3 0 0 T
4 1 1 T
5 0 0 T
6 1 1 T
7 0 0 T
8 0 0 T
9 1 1 T
10 0 0 T
11 0 0 T
12 0 0 T
13 1 1 T
14 1 1 T
15 1 1 T
16 0 0 T
Table 4.10: Tag Authentication
Process If Success, Abort if failure
Tag Authentication
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Parameters EPC Global Au-
thentication
Proposed Scheme
based on 8-Bit
LFSR
Proposed Scheme
based on 16-Bit
LFSR
Proposed Scheme
based on Diffie
Hellman Algo-
rithm
Man in middle at-
tack
low moderate High High
Mutual Authenti-
cation
low moderate High High
Cost less expensive less expensive Medium expen-
sive
More expensive
Operation used XOR Opera-
tion, Random()
function
XOR Operation
8-bits LFSR,
Seed value,
rand() function,
EXOR Opera-
tion, Random()
function
EXOR Operation
16-bits LFSR,
Seed value,
rand() function
Mod operation,
Power Operation,
Public value P
and Q
Table 4.11: Comparison between Existing Scheme and Proposed Scheme
4.2 Security Analysis
Man-in-the-middle attack prevention: In this approach a man-in-the-middle attack is pre-
vented. So, this is depend on a mutual authentication. Proposed scheme share only Seed
value(SV), not random number (18).
Mutual authentication :Authentication for Reader and tag is checking through EP-
WDLR=EPWDLT and Authentication for Tag to reader is checking from EPWDMR=EPWDMT.
Authentication is fail. And it finishes the connection else connection has been established
between tag and reader. So, mutual authentication is hold in this given scheme (3) (9).
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
In this thesis, an efficient Radio Frequency Identification mutual authentication scheme is
proposed using 16-bits Linear feedback shift register.16-bit random number is find using
16-bit linear feedback shift register. This proposed scheme is improving drawback of
EPC global class-1 generation-2 standard(C1G2) communication authentication scheme.
Using this scheme mutual authentication and man-in-middle attack are prevention.
The debate around technology and privacy has been going on to many years. Such
that technologies have become increasingly sophisticated for intercepting messages, the
ability of other people to see what we are doing has endangered an individual’s privacy
in our society. Inevitably, users place high priority on privacy and security in every RFID
application.
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